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The Curiosity at Work in 
Deconstruction  
Perry Zurn 
American University 
In the Honor of Thinking, Rodolphe Gasché argues that Jacques Derrida 
thinks “without wonder.”1 By this he means that Derrida’s thought has no 
proper philosophical beginning. Deconstruction is always already underway 
within the text and overtaken by its structural forces. But, if deconstruction 
does not start with wonder, then what? Where does Derrida begin? How does 
he begin in the face of his resistance to beginnings? Donna Haraway suggests 
that deconstruction begins with curiosity. Derrida, she writes, is “the most 
curious of men,” because he spots and responds to what interrupts and 
entangles us.2 Hélène Cixous affirms that deconstruction is indeed driven by 
“a curiosity for sighs and hesitations,” but she goes farther. She attests to 
sharing with Derrida a special curiosity: “a curiosity for the signifier, a 
greediness for tastetexts.”3 Without composing a foundation or origin, does 
deconstruction nevertheless begin here, with curiosity? And what would that 
mean for philosophy? Is this even a legitimate source for philosophy or does 
Derrida’s work stray from philosophy proper precisely because it is too 
curious, wallowing in a distracted “freeplay” and lost in labyrinthine 
wanderings, as his detractors suggest?4 
Although Derrida substantively analyzes curiosity as early as 1991, in his 
unpublished Répondre du secret lectures, and returns to it in 1997, via The 
Animal That Therefore I Am, it is in The Beast and the Sovereign I, Session 11, that 
he provides his most robust accounting of curiosity, which inevitably involves 
bringing it to account.5 “It’s a fine word,” Derrida writes, “a very fine verbal 
animal, curiositas.”6 The Latin curiositas is composed, as he points out, of two 
heads or two senses. On the one hand, and following the valence of curio, 
curiositas indicates an interrogating gaze set on an object. On the other hand, 
following cura, curiositas indicates the act of caring for someone or something. 
Each sense involves a particular treatment [traitement], in the double sense it 
has in French: curiositas may be expressed in the careless, detached handling 
of an object, or it may generate the regulated care of therapy. These two modes 
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of curiosity, Derrida suggests, are fruitfully illustrated through two moments 
in French history: 1) the 1681 autopsic dissection of an elephant in the court 
of Louis XIV and, less than a century later, 2) the therapeutic confinement of 
animals and humans in zoological gardens and asylums. I will call these two 
modes of curiosity autopsic and therapeutic, or dissecting and confining, 
respectively. 
While distinguishable, these two curiosities are, as Derrida demonstrates, 
modalities of a sovereign style of curiosity. Sovereignty is an illusion upon 
which, nevertheless, reason, knowledge, and power are built; in deciding “on 
what is [qu’est-ce que],”7 the sovereign claims sovereignty by circumscribing—
or asserting the limits—of words, beings, and states. Insofar as the autopsic 
and therapeutic modalities of curiosity negate the inherent instability of 
objects, divisions, walls, and procedures, they shore up the illusion of 
sovereignty, whether in the political or philosophical arena. 
Autopsic curiosity is a drive to dissect an object in the service of 
knowledge, cleanly separating one thing from another. Therapeutic curiosity 
is a drive to confine an object in the service of care, definitively isolating one 
thing from another. These modalities of curiosity, therefore, function within 
regimes of knowledge and treatment that capitalize on illusions of mastery. 
Derrida thus provides a damning critique of curiosity, leaving open the 
question of whether there are other echoes in curiositas that might harbor a 
curiosity less bound by traditional and often violent illusions; a curiosity more 
responsive to difference and reconciled with finitude; a style of curiosity he 
himself might endorse or at least welcome as an attribution. 
In what follows, I first explore the contentious attribution of curiosity to 
Derrida and deconstruction, before I turn to establish his critique of curiosity. 
I then argue there is a deconstructive style of curiosity that inhabits, resists, 
and disorganizes the sovereign style of curiosity in both its autopsic and 
therapeutic modalities. Because this account is only implicit within The Beast 
and the Sovereign I, I turn to Derrida’s earlier work on curiosity, in The Animal 
That Therefore I Am and Répondre du secret, to illustrate how curiosity can 
function deconstructively within texts and taxonomies. I demonstrate that 
deconstructive curiosity textually resists the autopsic by not allowing a clean 
dissection of terms and resists the therapeutic by compromising the clean 
confinement of terms. In doing so, it ruptures taxonomical distinctions 
between the human, animal, and plant. I conclude that, if curiosity is not 
governed by some final teleology, nor does it end in certainty, but rather, in 
an exemplary comportment of exploration, it tracks, probes, and suspends 
itself, as if to emphasize the meandering and precarious quality of knowledge, 
it must be traceable across species lines, well beyond the bounds of the 
human, which turns out to be just another sovereign illusion. Indeed, this 
suggests that Derrida’s practice of a deconstructive curiosity takes up a third, 
buried sense of curiositas, which precisely undergirds the other two: a clever, 
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fanciful attention to the seemingly trivial, which has, nevertheless, been made 
secret or of little import. 
Finally, I develop the implications of the deconstructive style of curiosity 
for the discipline of philosophy. Revisiting an exchange between Derrida and 
Sarah Kofman, I argue that deconstructive curiosity combats the illusions of 
pure revelation, whether through politics, science, scripture, or art, and 
instead draws attention to the conjuring trick, the systematic substitution of 
signs, that undergirds those illusions. In each case, deconstructive curiosity 
proliferates uneasiness and destabilizes sovereign impetus. While Derrida’s 
critique of curiosity impinges on history and science, aesthetics and 
phenomenology, his ultimate target is, as I will show in closing, the sovereign 
practices of traditional philosophy. The Platonic paradigm of Western 
philosophy proceeds to essences by way of diaresis and epimeleia heautou, 
dissection and self-care, as anchored in the human mind. Against this 
tradition, Derrida weaves a deconstructive curiosity that bedevils ahistorical 
concepts, displaces the centrality of the human in philosophy, and calls 
attention to the sleights of reason by which philosophy is enshrined as pure, 
abstract, and glorified. The deconstruction of curiosity here becomes the 
deconstruction of philosophy. The curious work of deconstruction, then, is 
not to abolish philosophy in any final way, but to re-conceive it as the practice 
of an exuberant, though no less hesitant curiosity. 
“The Most Curious of Men” 
In Infinitely Demanding, Simon Critchley argues that philosophy does not 
begin in wonder at the things that exist but rather in a disappointment that 
things are not what they might be.8 He is not the only one to suspect that 
reflective thinking is anything but wonderful. For Gasché, it is the honor of 
thinking to challenge the limits and the foundations of critique, theory, and 
philosophy. Gasché specifically addresses wonder. While philosophy may 
begin in wonder, thinking, real thinking—this is also for him deconstructive 
thinking—thinks without wonder. For Gasché, to think without wonder is to 
think without several basic assumptions that undergird the experience of 
wonder as traditionally conceived from Plato to Heidegger: that truth is 
universally accessible, by a unified subject, through fundamental 
philosophy.9 We have, in wonder, “a metaphysics of the subject,” an 
“anthropology,” and “features of humanism.”10 It is quite worrisome for 
Gasché that wonder presumes a gulf between subject and object, knower and 
known, the one who wonders and the wonderful. We can presume, Gasché 
argues, despite Derrida’s relative silence on the matter,11 that deconstruction 
necessarily does not begin in wonder and is not reducible to wonder because 
deconstruction functions on precisely the deterioration of these gulfs. This is 
but one of the reasons deconstruction signals the end of ‘philosophy’ as such. 
In one sense, Haraway begins When Species Meet where Gasché finished. 
Without addressing deconstruction’s turgid relationship to wonder, Haraway 
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states straightaway: “Derrida is the most curious of men, among the most 
committed and able of philosophers to spot what arrests curiosity, instead 
nurturing an entanglement and a generative interruption called response.”12 
For Haraway, deconstruction begins not with what arrests us, or stops us 
short—like wonder, but rather in what increasingly entangles and disrupts 
us—something she calls ‘curiosity.’ Deconstruction in this sense has a genesis, 
but that genesis is an irreducibly enmeshed beginning where, as she states, 
“to be one is always to become with many.”13 Before Haraway goes on to 
develop a robust cyborgism, focusing on the imbrication of the natural and 
artificial, she locates Derrida’s perhaps most enmeshed curiosity in The 
Animal That Therefore I Am. In his analysis of his cat staring up at his naked 
body, Derrida deftly disrupts the binaries between human, animal, and 
machine around the question of responsivity (and responsibility). While 
indebted to his analysis in important ways, Haraway nevertheless faults 
Derrida for not being curious enough about the curious cat to ask, “Can 
animals play? Or work? And even, can I learn to play with this cat? Can I, the 
philosopher, respond to an invitation or recognize one when it is offered?”14 
While I take Haraway’s point that Derrida incuriously abandons the 
cat—and many still wish Derrida had written a treatise on cats—it would be 
incurious itself to assume all curiosity is absent in the remainder of The Animal 
That Therefore I Am. Indeed, the curiosity at work in deconstruction is always 
already activated at the textual level. Writing as a philosopher (against 
philosophy), Derrida here works within and at the limits of several material 
and theoretical texts, including previous Cerisy conferences, Derrida’s own 
oeuvre, Genesis 1-3, and Alice in Wonderland. Deconstruction begins where it 
is, already inside a text, already in relationship to another, not over and 
against an object. To return to Gasché, deconstructive thinking is curiously 
compelled by the multi-valent resources of any given text. In turn, it sets out 
to compel every dominant discourse with the resistant resources within that 
discourse itself. If there is any wonder—or curiosity—at the outset of 
deconstruction, then, it is “nothing less than an awareness of being 
overtaken” by language and a corresponding impetus “to catch unawares and 
overtake” through the instability of discursive words themselves.15 Curiosity 
in deconstruction works with/in the text. 
It is Cixous, Derrida’s intimate interlocutor, who offers the most robust 
account of this curiosity so fundamental to Derrida and deconstruction.16 In 
Rootprints, she defines curiosity as “this urgency, this need to decipher what 
cannot be said, what is expressed otherwise than in verbal speech which 
nonetheless arouses the desire for words.”17 This curiosity for what is before 
language, which nevertheless exists in language, is something that both 
Cixous and Derrida share. For them, this is a “vital curiosity.” It is a curiosity 
that breathes and that writes. It is a curiosity that breathes writing and that 
writes out of breath.18 In Insister, she offers concrete features of this vital, 
textual curiosity. It is an urgent need for the richness of language. It is the 
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desire to trace the excesses of words, which escape even as they appear. It is 
an electric attraction to colloquialisms, to etymologies, and to word plays. 
When Derrida and Cixous write to one another or for one another, they write 
between philosophy and literature, as if in a dream space.19 In this dream-like 
writing of these dream-texts, curiosity plays a central role: 
[…] a curiosity for the signifier, a greediness for tastetexts, 
an inclination to jokes, Witz, witticisms, all those verbal 
penchants that lead us toward every kind of language 
activity or sport. With a curiosity for sighs and hesitations. 
And a curiosity for the abundantly stocked idiomatic 
storehouse of French of which in any and every context we 
exchange a few specimens that the worms had not gotten 
into.20 
The style of deconstructive curiosity mourned by Haraway is here seen and 
celebrated by Cixous. It is a curiosity for what is beyond language, for what 
exists in language, but particularly for what of the beyond exists in language 
such that language is overtaken, destabilized, and curiously compelled by 
itself. 
Such a description of deconstructive curiosity sounds dangerously close, 
if not identical, to a common mischaracterization of Derrida by some of his 
critics. As Jonathan Kendall famously claims in his obituary for Derrida, 
deconstruction is mere language play, the indulgence of a few private 
curiosities repeated ad infinitum across innumerable, though hardly 
illuminated, texts. Deconstruction is “slippery,” “murky,” and 
“contortionist,” proceeding by way of “puns, rhymes, and enigmatic 
pronouncements.”21 Such a misconstrual, Nicole Anderson notes, has been 
given academic pedigree by the likes of John Searle and Richard Rorty.22 In 
his review of Jonathan Culler’s On Deconstruction, Searle describes the 
outcome of deconstruction in the following way: “What we think of as 
meaningful language is just a free play of signifiers or an endless process of 
grafting texts onto texts.”23 For Searle, this makes deconstruction not only a 
failed literary theory, but a failed philosophy, as if Derrida’s textual curiosity 
excludes him from the realm of the truly philosophical. For Rorty, Derrida 
does indeed “giv[e] free rein” to his “fantasies” and “trains of association,” 
but this is in fact the requirement of liberal ironism.24 Where metaphysics has 
died, the only robust response is self-creation through contingent 
theorization. 
Derrida’s sympathizers, however, argue that his plays with words, 
genres, concepts, and arguments have more philosophical weight and rigor 
than Searle or Rorty would ever allow. Richard Klein, for instance, in his 
introduction to Derrida’s interview entitled, “Positions,” suggests that 
Derrida’s performance of differance is no mere amusement. Rather, it is a 
means by which Derrida launches a substantial critique of philosophy. Klein 
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argues that Derrida does so by inviting, upsetting, and then refashioning our 
curiosity. First, differance “invites the intrusion of our eager curiosity.”25 What 
will Derrida write? Will we finally access the truth? Then, it upsets our 
curiosity, so that “our curiosity—its misery or authenticity, its vulgarity or 
validity—[…] [is itself] put into question;” “we find our own impulses, 
ourselves, unaccountably on stage.”26 In doing so, Derrida confounds our 
illusions of access, whether metaphysics, idealism, teleology, spiritualism, 
logocentrism, essentialism, or history. Finally, differance highlights this 
curiosity—about the limits of curiosity and the illusion of the secret—which 
we might call deconstructive curiosity. Klein characterizes it as a Nietzschean, 
“vulgar curiosity” to see beneath the philosopher’s discourse, call forth what 
has been repressed, and honor a basic materialism.27 Derrida thus curiously 
celebrates the inherent play of language in order to critique the foundations 
of philosophical curiosity. 
In sum, scholars testify that Derrida is indeed driven by curiosity, may in 
fact harbor a deconstructive curiosity, and critically interrogates traditional 
philosophical curiosity. As it happens, Derrida himself bears witness to these 
claims. But we begin with his critique of curiosity in The Beast and the 
Sovereign. 
The Sovereign Practice of Curiosity 
The Beast and the Sovereign was Derrida’s final seminar at the École des 
hautes études en sciences sociales. As such, it rather appropriately offers a 
rumination on finitude, solitude, and the limits of human existence—whether 
in plants or animals, despots or figure heads. Beasts and sovereigns come to 
a head in Session 11, where Derrida undertakes a critique of curiosity as it has 
been traditionally theorized and practiced: a curiosity applied by the 
sovereign subject to or upon a creaturely object. Although he opens with a 
promise to address not “this or that curiosity” but “just curiosity,” as if it were 
some simple, unified thing, moreover, he closes with a reflection on this 
curiosity’s inherent duplicity. Such curiosity aims to observe and it tries to 
cure. It is at once autopsic and therapeutic, dissecting and confining.  
The culture of curiosity thus organizes the showing of 
curiosities for curious crowds, but the same culture of 
curiosity also had ambitions to treat, to care for, if not to 
cure. Or even to liberate by locking up differently. The cura 
of this curious curiosity always hesitated between two 
forms or two aims of what is always a treatment 
[traitement].28 
As I marked above, traitement has a duplicity that is analogous to that of 
sovereign curiosity, referring to careful treatment but also to coarse handling. 
The Latin cura, likewise, has two sides. Sometimes it is used to mark attentive 
inquiry. At other times, it means administrative oversight. Derrida argues 
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here that pre- and post-revolutionary France offer a perfect demonstration of 
curiosity’s duplicity, ranging from animal autopsy under Louis XIV to 
zoological gardens and mental asylums of the classical period. 
In 1662, Louis XIV established the Menagerie of Versailles, where, under 
the auspices of the Académie des Sciences, a variety of creatures were 
collected, studied, and dissected.29 Perhaps the most spectacular of these 
dissections occurred in 1681, when an elephant was carved up before the court 
and Louis XIV himself.30 This first, autopsic curiosity is “a seeing, a theatrical 
theorein, a gaze cast onto a visible ob-ject, a primarily optical experience that 
aims to touch with the eyes what falls under the hand, under the scalpel.”31 
Like the pure theorein of the eidos of Western philosophy, this modality of 
curiosity aims to reveal what is hidden through the exercise of a tactile sight 
that is at once disciplined and discursive. Skin is peeled from muscle, ligature, 
and bone. Joints are separated. Each cut unveils the nerves, arteries, and veins 
below. With this sort of sovereign curiosity, things are best seen when they 
are least alive. 
The French Revolution deemed the Menagerie of Versailles a spectacular 
waste of human wealth and animal life. Such collections, however, were not 
entirely obliterated. They survived in the form of 19th century zoos and 
asylums.32 Here, a second modality of curiosity appeared: the therapeutic. 
This curiosity had “the ambition or the pretension to treat, to care for, to take 
great care (cura) of what it was enclosing and objectifying and cultivating.”33 
There was, correspondingly, a marked improvement in living conditions for 
beasts, as well as “madmen.” Such care aimed not to identify some hidden 
truth but rather to manage behavior. It confined rather than dissected. 
Humans and animals were restricted, constrained, and placed in cell-like 
structures. Some were strapped to beds or locked in pens. Floors were padded 
or covered in hay. With this sort of curiosity, things are best treated when they 
are least free. 
For Derrida, pre- and post-revolution France have a culture of curiosity 
that shifts its practices from dissection to asylum or from the autopsic gaze to 
the therapeutic hand. Nevertheless, what remains consistent, he suggests, is 
this culture of curiosity’s intimate relationship to sovereignty.34 Whether 
curiosity constrains or confines, it does so to death. Autopsic curiosity is a 
matter of the “objectifying to death of the object.”35 Therapeutic curiosity, on 
the other hand, “consists in enclosing, depriving of freedom of movement 
and, hence, of freedom itself, hence of power, or power to see, to know, to 
have beyond certain limits, and hence of sovereignty.”36 Sovereign subjects 
exercise autopsic and therapeutic curiosities in such a way that they deprive 
their creaturely objects of self-sovereignty. Whether the curious gaze alienates 
beasts and “madmen” from itself or gathers them together, it dominates and 
subjectivizes them, denying them their sovereignty, their humanity, and even 
their animality. 
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Derrida briefly asserts that the elephant’s dissection under Louis XIV 
must be read within the larger context of medical history, depictions of 
anatomy, and Cartesian thought. He specifically states that Rembrandt’s 
famous painting, “The Anatomy Lesson of Dr. Nicolas Tulp” (1632), which 
depicts the dissection of an executed criminal, must be taken into account. 
What Derrida does not mention here, however, is that this painting formed 
the subject of his tribute to Sarah Kofman. Kofman wrote a brief, 
posthumously published essay entitled “Conjuring Death: Remarks on ‘The 
Anatomy Lesson of Dr. Nicolas Tulp.’”37 Derrida’s memorial essay for 
Kofman, simply titled (or not titled) “…..,”38 takes Rembrandt’s painting and 
Kofman’s commentary as its central texts. All three works—Rembrandt, 
Kofman, and Derrida’s—offer a specific analysis of dissection, which then 
extends to a broader reflection on curiosity itself. Kofman in fact wrote a 
second, complementary essay on curiosity, entitled, “The Imposture of 
Beauty: The Uncanniness of Oscar Wilde’s Picture of Dorian Gray.”39 In this 
instance, Kofman is concerned not with the cut of a scalpel but with a painting 
that captures—indeed, confines—Dorian. By analyzing both of Kofman’s 
texts, through Derrida’s memorial essay, I develop a deeper analysis of the 
sovereign style of curiosity, its nature and Derrida’s critique thereof. 
Rembrandt’s commissioned piece depicts the annual public dissection, 
sponsored by Amsterdam’s Guild of Surgeons and undertaken by Dr. Tulp, 
the guild’s Praelector Anatomiae.40 The event took place on January 31st, 
1632, in Amsterdam’s Anatomy Theatre (1639-1690), housed above a meat 
market in the convent chapel of St. Margriet, patron saint of pregnant and 
laboring women.41 The subject of dissection was a recently hanged recidivist 
thief, by turns referred to as Adrian Adriaenz or Aris Kindt, who was given a 
Christian burial as recompense for his posthumous service to God and 
country. Besides the guild members, the remaining guests were all notable 
persons, capable of paying a handsome price for their seat, a collection from 
which no doubt some of Dr. Tulp’s own remuneration was taken. The 
anatomy demonstration was, thus, at least as much an indication of wealth as 
it was a display of knowledge. 
In “Conjuring Death,” Kofman develops her own critique of curiosity. 
She begins by identifying the supposed lesson of the “Anatomy Lesson.” Dr. 
Tulp is surrounded by seven doctors; together, they compose the perfect body 
or corporation [font corps] of knowledge production and dissemination.42 This 
medical body, however, is entirely disembodied: almost everything beneath 
the white ruff at the doctors’ necks is shrouded in black. What is eminently 
visible is the cadaver. Lying nearly naked on a wooden table, with the 
vascular and skeletal structure of its left hand and forearm delicately splayed 
open, the hidden body appears doubly unveiled. This is Dr. Tulp’s lesson: the 
secret of the human body revealed. Kofman suggests, however, that the lesson 
is not successful. Although the cadaver is twice bared for all to see, every eye, 
without exception, is trained either on the anatomy book at its feet or on the 
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audience. No one is looking at the object of dissection. The object of dissection 
not only goes unnoticed, it also goes unnamed, lying there “in absolute 
anonymity.”43 The book, taking the place of both natural and spiritual 
revelation, is much like the cadaver, in that it goes unnamed and only the tip 
of its left page is displayed. In this multi-layered scene of visibility, then, 
Kofman traces what such visibility makes invisible. 
The role of the book in “The Anatomy Lesson,” at least from Kofman’s 
perspective, really cannot be fully appreciated without reference to The Picture 
of Dorian Gray. Wilde’s novel is a devastating tale. It begins with Dorian 
becoming bewitched by Lord Henry’s hedonism. Such an intense desire to 
experience the limits of sensual pleasure leads Dorian to sever his young 
beautiful body from his aging, slowly corrupting soul. The latter is caught—
or confined—in his friend Basil Halward’s painting of him. As Dorian goes 
about his life, he obsessively returns to the painting, which lies upstairs, in a 
locked room, behind a thick curtain. He returns “more and more curious.”44 
On Kofman’s reading, Dorian’s behavior can be explained as his futile attempt 
to conjure up, within his own face, an image of his mother’s beauty and 
thereby conjure away the truth that she is not only dead, but she has been 
decomposing now for some time. The Picture of Dorian Gray is therefore the 
story of a curious melancholy, a failure to mourn that inspires an obsessive, 
curious return.45 The conjuration at work here functions not through 
dissection this time but through confinement, a confinement whereby Dorian 
saves, cares for, preserves, and protects his own visage. While that visage was 
extracted by a rift between body and soul, a cut, a “knife thrust,”46 it is now 
preserved, sealed off through enclosure—much like Dr. Tulp’s book. 
Throughout her ruminations on “The Anatomy Lesson” and The Picture 
of Dorian Gray, Kofman demonstrates not only that curiosity naturally saps 
life and freedom, but that curiosity structurally covers over what it 
investigates. Kofman theorizes this duplicity in two ways. First, curiosity 
dissimulates in the very act of disclosure. In their “intense curiosity” for the 
“secret,” both the doctors and Dorian conceal the body they unveil. Second, 
curiosity represses in the very act of calling forth. “The fascination is 
displaced,” Kofman states, “from the sight of the cadaver to that of the 
book,”47 or from the body to the mirror. Sovereign curiosity—whether 
autopsic or therapeutic, dissecting or confining curiosity— ultimately is such 
that it bears on a split, a cut, a severance and produces two costly 
confinements: one of pure illusion and one of de-contextualized matter. In 
either case, curiosity functions on devastating, deadening, and debilitating 
illusions. For Kofman, this is the double face of sovereign curiosity. 
In his tribute to Kofman, Derrida is quick to grant her critique of 
curiosity. The doctors—and, by extension Rembrandt and their various 
audiences—“triumph over death,” as he explains, by “trying to forget, 
repress, deny, or conjure away death.”48 He then pauses over Kofman’s term 
of choice here: conjuration. “To ‘conjure death,’” Derrida writes, “implies both 
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to conjure it up and conjure it away […] and thus to pursue the other as the 
other dead.”49 Such conjuration, in its very denial of death through curiosity, 
nevertheless ‘pursues the other as the other dead’—whether dead on a slab 
(like Adriaenz or the elephant), dead in an anatomy book, dead in a painting 
(be it Rembrandt’s or Basil Hayward’s), or dead in a majestic floor-length 
mirror. It is reminiscent of the Eucharistic displacement and disavowal of the 
body into something else. Both autopsic and therapeutic curiosities, 
dissecting and confining curiosities, save their objects by conjuring them 
away and replacing them with an illusion. He writes: 
‘This is my body,’ ‘keep it in memory of me,’ and so, 
‘replace it, in memory of me, with a book or discourse to be 
bound in hide or put into digital memory. Transfigure me 
into a corpus. So that there will no longer be any difference 
between the place of real presence or of the Eucharist and 
the great computerized library of knowledge.50 
Derrida’s alignment of conjuration with “the Eucharistic paradigm” 
elucidates the curiosity we see across Rembrandt and Kofman, Christ’s body 
and the medical textbook. The practice of sovereign curiosity attempts to save, 
preserve, and know its objects by ‘bloodless abstraction’51 so that what feels 
alive—whether knowledge, beauty, or truth—is always already dead. This is 
the unique work of sovereign curiosity that Kofman uncovers and Derrida 
emphatically confirms and critiques. 
A Deconstructive Style of Curiosity 
How might curiosity be practiced otherwise, against the sovereign 
illusion of mastery, of clean dissections or safe confinements? How might 
curiosity challenge, rather than capitalize on, the subject/object distinction or 
the human/animal divide, whether at the level of texts or lived taxonomies? 
That is, what are or might be the elements of a deconstructive style of 
curiosity? And, in what sense, does such a style reprise certain resources 
hidden within curiositas that subtend the two classical senses of inquiry and 
care, autopsy and therapy? As I will argue, by developing the implicit 
descriptions of a deconstructive style of curiosity in The Beast and the Sovereign 
through The Animal That Therefore I Am and Répondre du secret, deconstructive 
curiosity is marked by hesitation and attention, playfulness and exploration 
not as distinct modalities but as fast proliferating modes of investigation. 
Because such modes belie the by turns brazen and whimsical 
meddlesomeness of a curiositas beyond its station, they immediately unsettle 
the too-easy alignment of curiosity with the human. Indeed, Derrida provides 
clues to a deconstructive style of curiosity precisely by reflecting on curious 
practices at the level of the animal, the vegetal, and the divine. 
Derrida opens The Beast and the Sovereign I, Session 11, with a somewhat 
cryptic remark that curiosity is a “fine word,” a “very fine verbal animal.” In 
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contrast to his use of the neologism animot,52 by which he marks that animality 
is a linguistic construct, Derrida’s characterization of curiosité as an animal, 
even a verbal animal, indicates that language itself is somehow non-human. 
What might this mean? This animal of a word, which Derrida uses throughout 
this session of The Beast and the Sovereign to mark sovereign power, is itself not 
sovereign. It moves from one meaning to another, from one practice to 
another, across shifts and slips of sense. Curiosité is overtaken by the inner 
resources of curiositas. And, in doing so, this verbal animal ‘curiosity’ can refer 
to a style of curiosity beyond the sovereign and beyond the human. 
Across philosophical history, curiosity is often characterized as properly 
human, not animal. Thomas Hobbes, for example, in the Leviathan, argued 
that curiosity is essentially a rational faculty, an interested inquiry into 
causation, that separates humans from animals.53 Resisting this basic 
opposition, Derrida troubles the alignment of curiosity with humans—and in 
fact multiplies its alignments first of all with animals. Before demonstrating 
this through The Beast and the Sovereign and The Animal That Therefore I Am, it 
is helpful to briefly review the scholarship on Derrida’s deconstruction of 
animality and humanity, especially with regard to curious questioning. In 
This is Not Sufficient, Len Lawlor remarks on how Western thought has 
typically denied animals the ability to question and to think, to answer and to 
name, but it has granted those abilities to humans.54 We have and they have 
not.55 Following Derrida, however, he insists that humans cannot ask a 
question either. True questions, questions worthy of the name, are 
unconditional questions, questions that are completely unreserved and open 
to what might come unannounced and unexpected. Irrespective of our 
personal limitations and investments, such questions are structurally 
impossible. We humans, then, like the animals, fail to question.56 This does 
not mean that there is no difference between a human and an animal but that 
both share a structural failure. The response to this failure ought to be, as 
Penelope Deutscher puts it, an “ethics of negotiation,” one that aims to 
cultivate “a patient, attentive, negotiating relationship to the ways in which 
we fail the other.”57 
Such an ethics, or a “deconstructive responsibility,”58 should not be 
undertaken, as one might more easily believe, by mimicking animal 
vulnerability in our writing and thinking,59 but rather by attending to that 
very same vulnerability shared between texts and creatures, thoughts and 
beasts. After all, as Cixous says, “There is animal trace, animals write.”60 What 
does this attentiveness look like? Lawlor thinks of it as writing like a cat: 
“when [Derrida] is writing aporias, he most resembles a cat pacing back and 
forth before a door, waiting to be let out or to be let in.”61 David Krell, by 
contrast, imagines writing like a Bernese Mountain dog. Referring to the 
German verb sinnen, meaning to thoughtfully meditate, Krell remarks that 
such work “meditates by sniffing, pursuing a scent, following a trace left in 
the ice of high mountains.”62 For Anne Berger and Marta Segarra, it means to 
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write scratching out or grafting new meanings “by nails or claws.”63 
Whatever animal or animal activity it resembles, Lawlor insists that this 
writing uses the techniques of waiting, following, carrying, and ‘not- 
thinking.’64 Together, such writing practices allow the development of what 
he calls ‘weak thought’—the sort that negotiates with its own vulnerability. It 
is the sort of thinking that misses, redraws, and fires again. It slips and it slips 
up. 
In The Beast and the Sovereign I, alongside his critique of sovereign 
curiosity, Derrida provides an implicit account of a deconstructive curiosity 
that is marked not by the illusion of absolute mastery but by a praxis of 
hesitation, humbly placing one foot in front of the other. Imagining a form of 
knowing inconsistent with the project of sovereign knowledge, Derrida 
speaks of “precisely the pas, the movement of a pas that consists in suspending 
with a ‘who knows’ and with so many ‘perhaps’s’, [suspending] the order and 
the authority of a sure knowledge, precisely, a knowledge sure of itself.”65 In 
French, “pas” is a homonym, meaning both “not” and “step.” This sort of 
knowing lifts its foot or its paw and suspends itself on a regular basis so as to 
negate any final achievement or command of the truth. If, following Erwin 
Straus, we understand walking as an act of “continuously arrested falling,” 
and as “motion on credit,”66 such a pedetic pursuit of knowledge precisely 
cannot be fueled by autopsic or therapeutic curiosity, since it does not 
intrepidly divide or confine. Instead, it tries and tests; it slips and stretches. 
As such, it is impelled by a curiosity of a “perhaps,” a “perhaps” that 
“abandons the shield of safety provided by power, presence, principle, and 
predictability,” as John Caputo argues, and “follow[s] the tracks of a more 
radical possibilizing.”67 It is a deconstructive curiosity that moves with 
exuberant hesitation. 
In The Animal That Therefore I Am, Derrida refuses to begin from the 
sovereign position of knower and maker. Rather, Derrida suggests he will 
respond and he will follow: je suis. This style of inquiry involves not only 
lifting one’s paw—or paws—but doing so repeatedly in order “to track, to 
sniff, to trail, and to follow”68 whatever has been denied voice, reason, or the 
honor of a question. It pitches its attention precisely against the grain of 
established hierarchies of value. Such an investigative mode, for Derrida, 
resembles the movement of an animal who, “finding its way on the basis of 
scent or a noise, goes back more than once over the same path to pick up the 
traces” or “pick up the scent.”69 Writing and thinking in a way that honors 
the “perhaps” and the “who knows” is not just pedetic but olfactory and 
auditory; it is marked not simply by hesitation and the pause of a paw, but by 
an attention to the trace of an-other. For Michael Naas, this explains Derrida’s 
flair; that is, his nose for the work and play of words. It is “a flair for language, 
true, but also for argument, and for the ways in which philosophical argument 
must always be tracked through the thickets of language; and claims […] must 
always be followed, ferreted out, and picked apart.”70 Derrida has a nose to 
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the ground, ferreting out the concepts, arguments, and systems that unsettle 
texts and taxonomies.71 He attends not to the new, but to the ‘already’ that 
disrupts what is.72 
A deconstructive style of curiosity is not only traceable in Derrida’s cat, 
in the angle of a gait and the waft of a scent, but also far beyond the animal 
kingdom, in moments of divine playfulness and vegetal exploration. In their 
own way, each of these traces is a mode of inquiry inimical to sovereignty. In 
the Judeo-Christian tradition, God is precisely not curious because he is all 
knowing.73 Derrida, however, attributes curiosity—and therefore a certain 
ignorance—to this God. Returning to Genesis in The Animal That Therefore I 
Am, Derrida notes that God brings the animals before Adam “in order to see” 
what he would call them.74 “This ‘in order to see,’” Derrida writes, “marks at 
the same time the infinite right of inspection of an all-powerful God and the 
finitude of a God who doesn’t know what is going to happen to him with 
language.”75 At this moment of radical divine vulnerability, God waits “with 
a mixture of curiosity and authority,”76 wanting playfully “to abandon 
himself to his curiosity.”77 It’s a dizzying thought. While Adam’s curiosity is 
both autopsic and therapeutic, aiming to mark each animal by its own name 
and to confine animals to their own proper groups, God’s curiosity waits to 
be surprised by another’s retooling of sense and sociality, language and the 
fabric of materiality. Deconstructive curiosity flourishes precisely in this 
infinite play between words, between things, or between words and things. 
Finally, in Répondre du secret, Derrida describes a “curiosity” of “vegetal 
being,” by which he means the “exploratory comportment” of flowers or 
trees, plants or roots.78 “Curiosity,” he writes, is typically defined as “the 
movement, the drive, or the desire to know;”79 if, however, it is broadened to 
mean “an exceptionally exploratory comportment of exploration,” then “one 
is completely right to attribute some curiosity not only to humans and to 
animals, but also to living beings that do not belong to the animal realm: e.g., 
flowers and trees.”80 For Derrida, Avital Ronell comments, “there are acts of 
questioning which do not necessarily take recourse to discursivity. […and] 
are not necessarily uniquely human. Plants may be questioning, too. […] 
Vegetal beings show curiosity: a plant or a root probes.”81 Indeed, plant 
exploration might extend to the dissemination of its seeds or the breaking 
open of its flowers.82 This vegetal mode of curiosity opposes specific illusions 
of sovereignty, such as absolute knowledge and independence, pure reason 
and teleological inquiry. Simultaneously, a vegetal mode of curiosity suggests 
an essayistic, vertiginous, and non-discursive praxis of inquiry. Such a praxis 
unsteadies the mythos that knowledge is inherently human, but also that 
knowledge is sure and steady, that it is based on staking claims more than 
stages of attention, and that it is more somber and serious than it is playful or 
breathless. 
Deconstruction begins (and it is always just beginning) with a curiosity 
at the limits of language, text, and taxonomy. Derrida takes his argumentative 
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cues from the fault lines of French and dares to probe their vulnerability. It is 
in this sense that Derrida actually does ask and develop an answer to: what is 
a cat’s curiosity? It is not a sovereign curiosity (like the autopsic or the 
therapeutic), but a deconstructive curiosity, one that tracks the scent of words 
and suspends its paw. It is a curiosity which, rather than opposing sovereign 
curiosity, slips through its clutches. Such a third curiosity challenges not only 
the illusion of a clean dissection or safe confinement, the definitiveness of a 
position or the stability of an opposition, but it also explores new, untested 
concepts and comportments. Fundamentally, such curiosity is a technique of 
deconstruction. It interrogates the limits of concepts, positional oppositions, 
and argumentative structures. It highlights the inherent instability of these 
critical elements and negotiates with that vulnerability. It is the philosophical 
implications of this criticality to which we now turn in closing. 
Philosophy After Wonder 
In this inquiry, we have seen why and how a deconstructive curiosity is 
deeply disruptive of sovereign curiosity. As a final step of this analysis, I want 
to explore the contours of that disruption at the level of philosophy. To do so, 
we must return to Kofman and to Derrida’s reading of Kofman. There, we can 
trace a re-imagination of philosophy, contra philosophy, through the 
pathways of curiosity.83  
Kofman certainly “points a finger” at the doctors, “protests” the 
conjuring movement, and “denounc[es] them to some extent.”84 While 
Derrida joins in the protest, he is interested in identifying the limits of 
Kofman’s denunciation. While at one level, he argues, Kofman critiques 
curiosity, at another, deeper level, she practices and therefore affirms it. 
Kofman has written an essay. Like the doctors of Amsterdam, she too has 
displaced the body with the book. She, too, has swapped one corpus for 
another. In fact, upon her death, she left a large body of work. Derrida takes 
a moment to reflect on Kofman’s corpus, pinpointing her texts on Nietzsche 
and Freud as exemplary. He remarks how Kofman displaces the body on the 
very same three registers of her critique: Dr. Tulp, Rembrandt, and the public. 
First, as if inspired by scientific curiosity, Kofman writes analytically. She 
analyzes books like Dr. Tulp dissects bodies, reading them “inside and out,” 
as if her interpretations were “operations, experiences or experiments.”85 
Second, as if driven by artistic curiosity, Kofman writes revealingly. She 
interrogates philosophical questions like Rembrandt paints a figure, turning 
her lucidity, her “ray of living light,” on a variety of issues, including death, 
melancholia, and sexuality.86 Third, in step with a long tradition of 
observations, interpretations, and commentaries, she has written 
speculatively or even scopophilically. 
Like the auditing public, Kofman summons Nietzsche and Freud “to 
appear and [to] speak.”87 In these ways, Kofman offers a bookish replacement 
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for the real cadaver, the real painting, even the real audience. What does it 
mean that “Conjuring Death” itself conjures death? What does it mean for 
Kofman to perform the very curiosity she critiques? What really is her 
position on curiosity?88 Kofman performs her curiosity through the medium 
of philosophical reading and writing. Through a particular style of 
philosophy, Kofman constructs other bodies, another form of a corpus. In 
doing so, Derrida argues, she not only critiques the movement whereby the 
body is displaced, but also affirms the movement of philosophical curiosity 
itself and even the knowledges it produces. 
She ends up affirming the triumph of life […] not through 
the relinquishing of a knowledge of death, but, on the 
contrary, through an active interpretation that renounces 
neither knowledge nor the knowledge of knowledge, that 
is to say, the knowledge of the role that occultation or 
repression might still play in certain forms of knowledge. 
Whence the deployment of so many types of knowledge, 
the rigorous analysis of an intersemiotic and intertextual 
imbrication of speech, writing, and the silence of the body, 
of the sacred book and the book of science, book and 
painting, in more than one corpus.89 
As Derrida observes, Kofman illuminates the dance whereby many, many 
forms of bodies are placing and displacing one another on the scene of life. To 
participate in this dance is as much an affirmation of life as it is a triumph over 
death. This affirmation, however, must be qualified. It is “without 
resurrection or redemption, without any glorious body.”90 Kofman does not 
participate in the Eucharistic movement whereby the body’s displacement is 
erased through its glorification. Hers is a non-salvific philosophical method 
that precisely calls attention to the conjuring trick rather than trying to pass it 
off as real. 
Derrida’s reading of Kofman demonstrates his sense that there is a 
deconstructive form of curiosity that is not only eminently textual (bedeviling 
any separability of concept and argument) and taxonomical (belying any 
clear-cut distinction between the species), but is expressive of a philosophy 
against philosophy, understood in its best, most critical sense. Such curiosity 
looks behind the curtain, calling awkward and often highly disruptive 
attention to the mechanics whereby illusions are made and sustained. If, in 
any of its guises, sovereign curiosity feigns interest in the other, but ultimately 
refuses to face that other, this deconstructive style of curiosity opens onto the 
other. It is responsive. It refuses to function within the economy of repression. 
For this reason, it is deeply affirmative. Of course, the risk of uncovering the 
conjuration of death and affirming the instabilities of life is that both death 
and life newly demand our committed and constant negotiation. What is 
philosophy if it is not this work? Derrida might answer that traditional 
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philosophy has in fact not grappled with life/death, but surreptitiously 
denied both. 
For Plato, and for much of Western philosophy after him, philosophy 
begins in wonder: “this wondering […] is where philosophy begins and 
nowhere else.”91 Such wonder is injected with vertigo in the face of aporia and 
perhaps with pain at the hands of a sharp question. Thereafter, philosophy 
proceeds through dissection, or diaeresis, and ultimately develops into a form 
of self-care, or epimeleia heautou. Diaeresis is a particular form of philosophical 
dissection, where a definition is developed through extended bipartite 
analysis. Plato defines both the sophist and the statesmen in this manner, in 
his eponymously titled dialogues. This involves repeatedly cutting in two, 
grabbing hold of what falls to the right of the incision, and cutting again.92 
This is how true essence is revealed. Epimeleia heautou is the therapeutic 
application of this scientific dissection to a philosophical life. As we see so 
well in the Apology, relentless inquiry forms the backbone of self-care. The one 
who heeds the Delphic Oracle and cultivates themself through an examined 
life—only this one is qualified to care for the city and lead it into its future.93 
For Plato, there is an organic progression from the wonder-inducing 
questions, through the self-examination of dissection, to a politically viable 
life of care. 
Insofar as autopsic curiosity is related to diaeresis and therapeutic 
curiosity to epimeleia heautou, the reading of Derrida’s analysis undertaken so 
far would indicate that wonder—properly philosophical wonder, Platonic 
wonder—is intimately related to sovereignty. Such an indication supports 
Gasché’s argument. If Derrida resists sovereign curiosity, it is only a matter of 
consistency to resist wonder as well. But philosophy, especially for Plato, does 
not only proceed by way of wonder, dissection, and self-care. It also proceeds, 
however inadvertently or tortuously, through semiotic language. Despite 
Plato’s vituperous rejection of rhetoric in the Ion and Republic, we see that his 
dialogues follow not merely reason, but shifts and slips of sense, not only 
assertion but humor and overall a real stylistic craft.94 Derrida seems to begin 
in this margin, this elsewhere, this space in which words overtake and carry 
you along into recesses that rupture any stable sense of meaning or practice 
of inquiry. In fact, just as Derrida’s critique of sovereignty supports his overall 
rejection of metaphysics, his critique of autopsic and therapeutic curiosity 
involves a re-imagination of philosophy. He demands that philosophy be 
done in another way and by other means. 
One technique Derrida recommends for doing philosophy differently is, 
as I have argued, the practice of a deconstructive curiosity. I began by 
analyzing Derrida’s commentators who suggest there is a distinctly 
deconstructive curiosity at work in Derrida’s person, as much as in his texts. 
I turned to Derrida’s treatment of autopsy and therapy, menageries and 
asylums, in The Beast and the Sovereign I to elucidate this curiosity as expressly 
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in contrast to sovereign curiosity. Finally, I returned to Derrida’s commentary 
on Kofman, through which he suggests that deconstructive curiosity may be 
expressed as a style of curiosity that affirms the vagaries and instabilities of 
life, while unmasking the conjuration of death. I concluded by placing this 
deconstructive style of curiosity within the context of the Platonic tradition. 
The former, fueled by what could be called, counter-intuitively, a ‘rhetorical 
question,’ literally asks for something other than to be answered. It asks to be 
destabilized, to be surprised, and to ask again. 
Practicing philosophy in the style of a deconstructive curiosity is a multi-
modal enterprise. This is a kind of curiosity that uses language hesitantly, 
being particularly attentive to the work and play of words just as it explores 
what always somehow escapes words. It is a curiosity that refuses to keep the 
steady beat of knowledge and in fact mischievously renounces whatever 
access power and position are supposed to afford. It is a curiosity that sinks 
deep into the materiality of the earth in order to tentatively reach for resources 
and sow belonging. A curiosity that is not only far from human but 
deconstructs the taxonomies whereby the human is made superior to and 
separate from other living things. A deconstructively curious philosophy 
blithely fails to uphold illusions of mastery. It breaks metaphysical mirrors. 
And it refuses to construct any glorious body by investigating the other as a 
bloodless abstraction. It is a philosophy predicated on entanglement with 
whomever and wherever one finds oneself, and a responsiveness to that 
entanglement. It engages in an attentiveness to an-other or others discursively 
and/or materially denied voice, to textual elements that have been 
subordinated, and to histories that have been hidden or silenced. And its 
philosophical mindfulness is playful, open to surprise and humble before 
what ultimately cannot be controlled or claimed: the proliferation of 
difference in language and among the living. It is the sort of philosophy that 
puts down roots, less to secure and to establish than to build shared resources 
and community. Such a philosophy trails, and it wanders. 
What are the implications for a Derridian account of curiosity? At the 
outset, Derrida’s work aids us in understanding curiosity not as 
monolithically good or bad, but rather as a triumvirate of practices implicated 
in a series of hierarchies and responsibilities. By situating these various forms 
of curiosity in the history of science, Derrida pushes us to re-evaluate the 
progress of knowledge. Moreover, by unmooring curiosity—setting it adrift 
among plants, animals, humans, and beyond—Derrida implies that the 
ecological turn in philosophy will need to account for curiosity and work in 
tandem with revolutions in theology. Ultimately, however, a Derridian 
account of curiosity requires that we reconfigure philosophy. What would it 
mean if philosophy were driven by wonder no longer but by this 
deconstructive curiosity? Or perhaps it already begins in such curiosity, with 
the inquisitive modes of hesitation and attention, playfulness and exploration. 
If so, what would it mean to recognize that fact? To whom and for what would 
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it matter? There is certainly a humility required here, at the level of texts and 
lived taxonomies, but also the honor of thinking with all the exuberance and 
poverty of organic life. 
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